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CHAPTER 9 




Microfinance, formerly celebrated as a most successful development tool, has 
been confronted with harsh criticism in recent years. It is claimed to have contrib-
uted to clients’ over-indebtedness while having failed to deliver on its promise of 
reducing poverty. By reviewing recent evidence, this paper aims for a more realis-
tic assessment of the microfinance approach. It is argued that borrowing always 
goes along with risk. Accordingly, the danger of over-indebtedness can be amelio-
rated by responsible finance practices, but never eliminated. Nevertheless, micro-
finance deserves its place as a development tool. Even if positive impacts are 
much smaller than claimed in the past, the impact stream is able to flow for as 
long as the microfinance supplier survives. As there is proof that temporary sup-
port can build sustainable institutions, the cost-benefit ratio still seems to speak in 
favour of the microfinance approach.  
1 Motivation: Impact Crisis in Microfinance 
“The Promise of Microfinance“ was the title of Jonathan Morduch’s seminal pa-
per in the Journal of Economic Literature in 1999, for the first time introducing 
microfinance to a broader academic public. At the time, the title reflected rather 
accurately the spirit of all those politicians, donors or practitioners supporting the 
microfinance approach as a means to fight poverty in developing countries. A little 
more than a decade later, public opinion on microfinance has dramatically changed. 
Microfinance is accused of absorbing billions of donor funds while showing little or 
no effect on improving the livelihoods of the poor (Drake 2009; Harford 2009). 
Even more alarming, reports on microfinance clients in India appeared in the media 
who, in desperate situations of over-indebtedness, took to suicide as the apparent last 
resort (Biswas 2010). The question is posed in public 358 Die Unternehmung, 
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66. Jg., 4/2012 whether for the poor microfinance has turned “from a blessing to a 
curse” (Wade 2010). In a nutshell, the utmost praise of microfinance in 2006, when 
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, be-
came scepticism and even outright criticism merely a few years later.  
The trigger, which caused this back swing in microfinance’s media coverage, 
was twofold. On the one hand, the first few academic studies were published that 
attempted to rigorously measure the impact of microfinance by comparing the 
livelihoods of microfinance clients to a control group, which is similar to the client 
group in every respect except for a lack of financial access. The reported results 
fell short of what some promoters of microfinance had claimed, and made the 
hope of microfinance lifting millions out of poverty look like a mere illusion. On 
the other hand, the financial crisis in 2008/2009 revealed to everybody that micro-
credit is not without risk for its clients. In some overheated microfinance markets, 
which had shown annual growth rates in the double digits previous to the crisis, 
repayment rates dropped drastically and left an unknown number of clients in the 
state of over-indebtedness. Those who gave early warnings about the dangers of 
commercialisation in microfinance felt substantiated in their reasoning.  
It is far from obvious, however, that the new evidence brought forward by rig-
orous impact studies and the aftermath of the financial crisis gives sufficient cause 
to overthrow everything supposedly known about microfinance, and to abandon 
all hopes of microfinance as an effective tool to improve the lives of low-income 
people in the developing world. After all, the financial crisis was a singular shock, 
and the evidence from over-indebted clients is primarily based on anecdotal evi-
dence. Likewise, the evidence produced by rigorous impact studies is still scarce, 
and these studies are rather limited in what they can measure. Therefore, rather 
than premature rejection, recent evidence calls for a reassessment of the microfi-
nance approach, of its potential achievements and its risks.  
Contributing to such a reassessment is the motivation for this paper. A recapitu-
lation of how the microfinance approach originated and what spurred the hopes 
going along with it will be combined with a review of what we know about micro-
finance’s impact and what we don’t. This shall form the basis of a realistic judge-
ment on what can be expected when opening access to finance for those, who 
formerly had been excluded from formal financial services.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly revisits the emer-
gence of the microfinance approach in the 1990s; section 3 summarises the current 
knowledge on the risk of over-indebtedness which goes along with microcredit; 
section 4 puts the new evidence produced by rigorous impact analyses into per-
spective; section 5 concludes with some remarks on the virtues, the vices, and new 
challenges of the microfinance approach. 
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2 The Microfinance Revolution – Revisited 
What was the “promise of microfinance” all about, raising the hopes of access to 
finance as a way out of poverty? Following a period of disappointing results in all 
attempts to foster micro and small enterprise via directed lending in the 1970s and 
1980s, a paradigm shift in the development approach brought about a change for the 
better. The provision of concessional credit lines reserved for those who were 
thought to be too poor to be bankable was replaced by the approach of building fi-
nancial institutions (Krahnen/Schmidt 1994) specialised on serving the target groups 
formerly excluded from access to the formal financial system. The results of this 
paradigm shift, which took place in the early 1990s, were actually promising.  
Donor funds, provided by means of directed lending, often went along with 
dismal repayment performance and frequently never even reached the target group 
due to adverse incentives produced by low interest rates. In sharp contrast, micro-
finance institutions (MFIs) supported by donor money for institution building 
managed to recapture the loans disbursed to micro entrepreneurs. Thanks to a 
credit-technology based on cash-flow assessment and graduation, rates of arrears 
stayed even below those of established banks in the same region. By the end of the 
1990s, the ‘microfinance revolution’ – as it was frequently called – held the prom-
ise of offering a ‘win-win’ solution of suppliers and customers likewise profiting: 
After an initial phase of support for institution building, MFIs seemed to be able to 
offer financial services to the formerly underserved while covering costs or even 
producing moderate profits; and microfinance clients were receiving a sustainable 
access to formal financial services going along with new opportunities to smooth 
income and enlarge their businesses, thereby improving the livelihoods of their 
families or even transcending poverty. As such, microfinance appeared to be an 
extremely cost-effective approach to fight poverty: Once an MFI was built up and 
working, it was able to survive in the financial market on its own account. There 
was no need for further subsidies to keep open the window of opportunity which 
access to finance was offering to the poor.  
The success story of microfinance spreading around the developing world 
seemed to confirm this way of thinking. Flagship MFIs were transforming into 
licensed banks without abandoning their target group of micro entrepreneurs and 
low-income households. At least in urban areas, these clients were getting access 
not only to microcredit, but also to other financial services like savings accounts 
and transfers of payments. Time intensive transformation of non-governmental 
organisations into professional banks was more and more often replaced by a 
‘greenfielding’ approach, i.e. the foundation of fully-fledged microfinance banks 
right from the start. MFIs were getting less and less dependent on refinancing 
lines by donors, development banks or ethical investors. Instead, they were col-
lecting local deposits or even tapping the capital market by issuing bonds. Sin-
gular micro banks in different countries were united in networks or under a 
holding to form micro banking groups, adding to knowledge sharing as well as 
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improved liquidity and risk management. Since the turn of the millennium, spe-
cialised microfinance investment vehicles, refinanced by development finance 
institutions and ethical investors, have offered debt and equity finance to advanced 
MFIs; and on 20th April 2007, another milestone in the development of the micro-
finance sector was marked by the Initial Public Offering of the Mexican Banco 
Compartamos, an MFI founded in 1990 with grants from several donor sources 
(Rosenberg 2007). Microfinance was certainly on the way to becoming an integral 
part of the financial market.  
By the end of 2008, shortly before the effects of the financial crisis had reached 
microfinance, the Microfinance Information eXchange, the most comprehensive 
database on microfinance, reported, based on the data of almost 1400 MFIs, that 
these institutions were reaching out to over 86m borrowers and almost 96m volun-
tary savers worldwide (Gonzalez 2009). The average loan balance per customer, a 
common proxy or target group orientation, was below USD 1,600. Furthermore, 
on average institutions were earning profits (return on equity 1.4 % on average, 
median 8.9 %). There were regional differences as microfinance in Africa was 
clearly lagging behind. Furthermore, data on the Microfinance Information eX-
change are positively biased as more successful MFIs are more likely to report. 
Nevertheless, hundreds of MFIs around the world were giving proof of what had 
seemed impossible before the microfinance revolution: The target group of micro 
entrepreneurs and low-income households can be financially served without con-
tinually loosing money.  
However, progress in financial performance of MFIs was not equally welcomed 
as a success by all protagonists of the microfinance idea. With the IPO of Banco 
Compartamos in 2007, which attracted commercial investors not least because of 
the bank’s high return on equity, warnings were getting louder that microfinance 
is loosing out on its original mission of helping the poor. Being hit by the financial 
crisis in 2009 put a definite halt to microfinance’s boom. Reports on clients’ over-
indebtedness in the aftermath of the crisis as well as rigorous impact studies fail-
ing to prove noticeable poverty reduction effects of microfinance added to the 
doubts about financial success of MFIs automatically going hand in hand with 
benefits for the poor. 
3 Over-Indebtedness – A Widespread Phenomenon in 
Microfinance? 
3.1 The Downside Risk in Microcredit 
While microfinance now covers a wide range of financial services for low-income 
households, initially the microfinance movement was mainly associated with ac-
cess to credit for micro entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding all the potential positive 
impacts of access to loans, borrowing money is never without risk.  
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On the creditor’s side, risk is pretty well documented by rates of arrears and 
loan writeoffs. On the borrower’s side, however, risk going along with borrowing 
is much more difficult to capture; its documentation is correspondingly weak. Of-
ten, information from the MFIs about repayment rates was and still is taken as a 
proxy for the degree to which borrowers have debt problems. The excellent re-
payment performance, which contributed to the high expectations put into the mi-
crofinance approach, was taken as a reliable signal for risks being rather low on 
the borrowers’ side. However, there always were occasional warnings that taking 
arrears as a proxy might be missing out on something.  
Back in 1996, Hulme and Mosley in their well-known book “Finance against 
Poverty” had already pointed out that borrowers might be worse off than before if 
they fail to repay, and they called for more intensified research on the livelihood 
of borrowers who drop out of a credit scheme (Hulme/Mosley 1996, 119–121). 
The authors were asking MFI staff for their estimations on the percentage of bor-
rowers who have trouble meeting their loan obligations and who are likely to go 
bankrupt. Additionally, Hulme and Mosley collected anecdotal evidence on delin-
quent borrowers’ suffering, e.g. when collateral was seized.  
Actually, this is the borrower’s downside risk of a credit contract. In contrast 
to equity finance, which shares the business risk between entrepreneur and eq-
uity provider more or less symmetrically, a credit contract does not spell out an 
equal participation in entrepreneurial risk. If the business goes well, the earnings 
exceeding the loan obligations will belong to the entrepreneur. If the business 
fails, however, it will always be the borrower who takes the first loss while the 
creditor only looses out once the borrower’s repayment capacity is exhausted. 
Supporters of microfinance were well aware of this risk, commonly called fi-
nancial leverage risk, when in the beginning of the 1990s the institution building 
approach was developed. There were even some pilots and studies on micro eq-
uity finance in the form of venture capital. It just turned out to be too expensive, 
however, to provide small financial volumes as equity participation.1 There 
would not have been a realistic chance to turn micro venture capital into a cost-
covering endeavour. Therefore, microcredit seemed to be the only option to cre-
ate access to finance for the target group without the need for continual subsi-
dies. Excellent repayment rates of microcredit as well as huge demand for this 
service laid remaining concerns to rest.  
This changed, however, with microfinance turning into a business, particularly 
as suppliers entered the market that, under the flag of microfinance, started to roll 
out small consumer loans on a big scale. Already before the outbreak of the finan-
cial crisis, when microcredit was growing in double-digit annual rates, warnings 
                                                          
1 Pretes (2002) promotes micro equity to avoid financial leverage risk. However, he un-
derlines that micro equity in his definition is provided as a grant, and not as cost cover-
ing venture capital. 
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on the danger of households’ over-indebtedness were surfacing.2 Promoters of the 
microfinance approach as a development tool reacted with campaigns and princi-
ples for responsible finance (www.smartcampaign.org), to which institutions with 
a double mission, i.e. financial and social, readily committed themselves. This 
might not have been sufficient to protect microfinance clients, however, as the af-
termath of the financial crisis made apparent. 
3.2 Household Over-Indebtedness – A Phenomenon Difficult to Capture 
Whether the spreading of microcredit actually led to an increase in human trage-
dies most likely will never be clarified with certainty. However, knowing about 
the downside risk of borrowing provides sufficient cause to try to find effective 
ways for client protection. This is all the more important as the microfinance 
movement is spreading in low income countries, where the legal framework aim-
ing at client protection is not yet very sophisticated. Even if laws, often initiated 
through the microfinance donors, to promote transparency of interest rates are 
more frequently put in place, and even if microcredit institutions are obliged to 
explain risks, e.g. going along with foreign currency loans, clients often have dif-
ficulties in understanding their contract terms nevertheless, due to a lack in finan-
cial literacy. The most important corner stones of client protection, which would 
have the power to effectively protect borrowers if they fail, are still missing in al-
most all microcredit markets in the developing world: A consumer insolvency law 
with debt relief combined with a formal social safety net. With these in place, an 
income on the subsistence level and the opportunity for a fresh start would be 
guaranteed also to those borrowers who get caught in a debt trap.  
It is difficult to define at which point debt service becomes unbearable and the 
fine line is crossed between indebtedness and over-indebtedness (Hottenrott 2002, 
Alam 2012). Even functioning insolvency laws in developed countries face this 
challenge. Over-indebtedness as a legal term is usually reserved for companies 
with limited liabilities, describing a state in which liabilities exceed assets, and 
accordingly the company’s equity is negative. When translating this definition into 
the context of an individual borrower, two difficulties arise. The inventory of an 
individual borrower’s liabilities not only has to cover all personal debt, but also 
has to pin down a financial figure to represent future expenses to guarantee a liv-
ing at least on the subsistence level. Likewise, on the asset side, beside all tangible 
and financial assets to the borrower’s name, the inventory will have to include an 
item for the human capital, representing the capacity to earn future income. Natu-
rally, estimations of future income, most likely forming the most important asset 
of borrowers without material wealth, as well as an estimation of future living ex-
                                                          
2 Potential problems coming along with growth rates of that magnitude can be manifold. 
A very important one in microfinance was a shortage in qualified staff. Recruiting and 
training could not keep up with the same pace as the portfolios were growing without 
loosing out on quality. 
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penses is afflicted with a relatively high degree of uncertainty. That is why even in 
developed countries individual borrower’s over-indebtedness is not a juridical 
term. Instead, not meeting debt obligations is taken as the trigger for individual 
insolvency procedures, which takes us back to where we started, that is arrears as 
a proxy for over-indebtedness.  
Some countries, however, allow individuals to file for insolvency if they can 
prove it to be unlikely that they will be able to meet debt obligations in the future. 
This seems to be more adequate to protect clients from downside credit risk. Debt 
entanglement is likely to start much earlier than at the point in time when it be-
comes impossible to serve debt obligations. Not being able to turn anywhere for 
legal help when debt burdens are starting to become unbearable is particularly 
devastating for low-income borrowers in developing countries. As there is no for-
mal social safety net, unlucky borrowers whose businesses fail might even con-
tinue the debt service although they urgently would need the little money they 
have for basic living expenses like food, school fees or medical expenses. Hardly 
anything systematic is known about the extent of struggling before borrowers ac-
tually fail on their debt obligations. A recent contribution to closing this knowl-
edge gap, which Hulme and Mosley had pointed out more than 15 years ago, is an 
empirical research by Jessica Schicks (2010). 
3.3 The Extent of Over-Indebtedness 
The extent of over-indebtedness, which is found in microfinance markets, clearly 
depends on the definition employed as well as on the research design. Schicks’ re-
search (Schicks 2010, 2012) aims at grasping over-indebtedness from a clients’ 
perspective, and thereby laying the foundations for a pragmatic definition of over-
indebtedness, which does not draw on the insufficient proxies of delinquency or 
failure to meet payment obligations. The research relies on 2010 data gained from 
structured interviews of more than 500 urban micro borrowers in Ghana. The in-
terviewees were randomly sampled from the customer base of five well-known 
Ghanaian MFIs. Clients who were in arrears were slightly over-sampled to have a 
sufficient representation. The over-sampling was corrected for in the subsequent 
analysis by assigning weights to the different sample groups. During the inter-
view, clients were confronted with a given list of potential “sacrifices”, e.g. work-
ing more, eating less, taking children out of school, and they were asked to pick 
out those sacrifices, which they experienced in the context of recent loan repay-
ments. In a second step, they were asked to rank on a scale of one to five whether 
they considered their individual sacrifices as acceptable (1) or totally unacceptable 
(5). In the case that a client frequently (3 times or more) suffered sacrifices rated as 
unacceptable, he or she was counted as overindebted. About 30 percent of the sam-
ple fell under this pragmatic and client-focussed definition of over-indebtedness. In-
terestingly enough, the urban Ghanaian microfinance market does not count as par-
ticularly riddled by problems of over-indebtedness, and according to the informa-
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tion systems of MFIs, rates of arrears were on a much lower and from their credi-
tor’s point of view a rather acceptable level. 
Obviously, this research is but a first step, and it is certainly no proof that bor-
rower struggling is caused by micro loans. Being able to draw conclusions in that 
direction requires comparing interview results to those of a control group who is 
similar to the client group, except for not having to serve a loan. Actually, more 
rigorous research relying on a control-group approach could even reveal that 
households without any micro debt suffer even more because they are lacking the 
opportunity to smooth their consumption stream via borrowing. Almost all of the 
clients who took part in the interviews in Ghana and were classified as over-
indebted firmly stated that they want to borrow again, some of them even higher 
amounts if possible. This is quite a firm indication that even those clients who suf-
fer in serving their debt put a high value on financial access. Nevertheless, Schicks’ 
results substantiate the suspicion that something important is left out when figures 
about portfolio risk and failure rates are the only inputs relied upon when estimat-
ing the extent of over-indebtedness.  
More research, and specifically more research of a rigorous kind is needed to 
say more; and unfortunately the few results we do have (see Alam 2012, Schicks/ 
Rosenberg 2011 for an overview) give few new ideas on what more could be done 
against the problem of overindebtedness. Closing the credit window is obviously 
not a viable option, as it would cut clients off from the upside potential of loans at 
the same time. Commitment to principles of responsible finance still seem to be 
the best preventive measure from the MFIs’ side, including a careful assessment 
of clients’ repayment capacity, an abdication of unethical methods of loan collec-
tion, an adaption of payment schemes to borrowers income streams, and an as-
sessment of options for rescheduling in case of problems.  
However, there is no way that responsible finance can compensate for a lack of 
official help for debt-trapped households, i.e. via an insolvency law providing a 
fresh start, or via formal social safety nets. As the downside risk of credit cannot 
be ruled out ex ante, it seems all the more important that for the vast majority of 
clients the potential positive impact of microfinance more than compensates for its 
risk. In this light, the existing evidence on microfinance’s impact on the livelihood 
of the poor deserves the utmost attention. 
4 Impact Measurement in Microfinance – Results and 
Limitations 
4.1 Control Group Designs to Capture Impact on Microfinance 
Beneficiaries 
The success story of microfinance as a tool to fight poverty was based predomi-
nantly on two pillars: Firstly, the achievements in building financially viable MFIs 
serving millions of customers formerly excluded from the formal financial system, 
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and secondly an unaccounted number of anecdotes about how microfinance 
changed the lives of beneficiaries. The latter, however, are far from providing rig-
orous evidence that access to finance brought about the change for the better. 
Firstly, a before-after comparison, which is typical for anecdotes, fails to single 
out the influence of microfinance. It might have been simply an extraordinary en-
trepreneurial spirit of the owner (or something else), and not a microloan, which 
was pivotal in turning a tiny market stall into a thriving business. Secondly, the 
occasional story about a successful client might be cherry-picked from a pool of 
clients who on average were by far less fortunate.  
Impact studies of an experimental or quasi-experimental design (Duflo et al. 
2007) are promising to provide a more reliable foundation for microfinance’s 
claim of benefitting the poor. Inspired by the methodology of pharmaceutical stud-
ies, these impact studies statistically mimic a comparison between the situation 
with and without access to finance. With anecdotal evidence, a ‘with versus with-
out’ comparison is impossible; it is contrafactual because a single person either 
can, or cannot, have access to finance. However, experimental impact studies cir-
cumvent this problem by comparing the target group of an intervention, in our 
case the customers of a microfinance institution, with a suitable control group. 
Ideally, the control group is as good as identical to the target group, except for the 
latter having access to finance, while the former is lacking it. The most reliable 
method to gain a target and a control group, which at least from a statistical point 
of view are identical, is to randomly divide a large group of individuals into those 
who receive the ‘treatment’ and those who do not. This random selection is re-
flected in the name of that experimental method, which is classified as most reli-
able, the so-called Randomised Controlled Trials (RCT). As can easily be imag-
ined, it is as good as impossible to apply this method when aiming to measure the 
impact of microfinance. A random selection of individuals into target and control 
group might be possible if two financial products are tested against each other, but 
it hardly seems realistic to use a random selection if it is a question of access ver-
sus non-access. However, the strict methodology of RCT can be relaxed by apply-
ing a quasi-experimental design. There is a wide range of methods to define a con-
trol group in a quasi-experiment. The pipeline approach makes use of similar 
groups receiving the ‘treatment’ at different points in time. Accordingly, the group 
treated later in time can serve as the control group for those who are treated first. 
Propensity score matching is a method to artificially create a control group by 
finding an ‘untreated’ statistical twin for each target group member. In impact 
studies of microfinance, researchers usually try to identify a control town quarter 
or village, which is inhabited by community members very similar to those in the 
target area where a new branch of an MFI is going to open.  
In the course of the (quasi-)experiment, data is collected from both groups, ide-
ally before the intervention as well as afterwards. The ‘double’ difference in the 
average livelihoods of the two groups – given that both are large enough to statis-
tically eliminate any random influence through the law of large numbers – allows 
for the isolation of microfinance’s impact: The first difference of potential impact 
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variables, e.g. business activities, income, education or health, is taken before the 
new financial window opens, and this difference will be close to zero if the two 
groups are selected well and accordingly are (almost) identical in a statistical 
sense. The second difference is taken after the target group receives access to fi-
nance. The improvement or deterioration in livelihoods in comparison to the con-
trol group, measured at the same point in time, gives the impact of microfinance 
(after correction for any difference between target and control group which was 
detected by the comparison before the intervention).  
Experimental as well as quasi-experimental designs result in much more reli-
able impact measurements than any before versus after comparison can offer. 
However, the measurement is valid exclusively for the single intervention, which 
was the object of the study (internal validity). A larger number of impact studies 
of a similar kind are necessary to gain insights on whether results are of a more 
general nature and whether similar effects can be expected when the intervention 
in question is replicated in other settings (external validity). Systematic reviews 
offer a framework to analyse the question of external validity, given that a suffi-
cient number of impact studies on a certain intervention type is entering into the 
review. According to the methodology of systematic reviews, only impact studies 
meeting the experimental or quasi-experimental standard are to form the base of 
analyses. The quality standard applied as well as the search process and range 
must be documented exante. Depending on the number and quality of studies, 
which enter a systematic review, it will deliver conclusions on whether impacts of 
the intervention in question show a low or a high variability subject to the re-
gional, cultural or socio-economic setting. 
4.2 Rigorous Impact Studies on Microfinance – Results 
What is the rigorous evidence then, on which the microfinance approach can rely 
when trying to prove its benefit? While a few years back there was not even a hand-
ful of microfinance studies applying a control-group-approach, the body of evidence 
has become much larger in the last two years. Three systematic reviews have been 
published at this point. The first one, published in 2010, focussed on Sub-Saharan 
Africa (van Roojen et al. 2012); it is based on 15 impact studies in 10 countries. The 
second review by Duvendack et al. (2011) relies on evidence worldwide provided by 
58 studies in 19 countries. The third review (Pande et al. 2012) includes 12 studies 
in 10 countries worldwide. At least one more systematic review focussing on evi-
dence from the Asian region is in the process of being conducted (Stewart et al. 
2011). Only a small minority of the individual studies actually follows the gold 
standard of RCT design. Most studies aim at measuring the impact of microcredit; in 
single cases the question of impact is addressed for agricultural credit, micro sav-
ings, micro insurance, micro leasing or new banking technologies.  
All in all, the impact of microfinance, which was observed, was rather mod-
erate, and certainly fell short of the “Microfinance Promise” of lifting millions 
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of people out of poverty. There is quite reliable evidence from several studies 
that access to microcredit actually had positive effects on entrepreneurial activi-
ties, e.g. the foundation of new businesses or the enlargement of existing ones. 
Likewise, positive effects on acquiring durable goods were found. There is little 
evidence, however, that microfinance led to a general improvement of liveli-
hoods. Several studies find no effect on income or general well being; single 
studies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, conclude positive effects on income, 
health or the quality of housing and food. However, there is occasional evidence 
as well that access to microloans, particularly if the money was not invested, but 
used for consumption purposes, increased vulnerability or had negative effects 
on the schooling of children. Parallels to the results of Schicks’ study on over-
indebtedness are evident.  
Quite frankly, this is no overwhelming proof of microfinance’s power to fun-
damentally change the lives of the poor. It can be concluded that microfinance cer-
tainly is no magic bullet to fight poverty, and there is no rigorous evidence that mi-
crofinance turns subsistence-level enterprises into flourishing small firms on a large 
scale. However, microcredit can support entrepreneurial activity on a moderate 
level, and it can help to accumulate durable assets, perhaps even help to moderately 
improve income and living conditions in general. These potential benefits come 
for the price of additional risk, particularly if the loan is used for consumption.  
Certainly, the evidence provided by rigorous impact studies is still preliminary, 
but it seems sufficient to put “The Promise of Microfinance” into a more realistic 
perspective. Advocates of the microfinance approach need to be much more mod-
erate about what can be achieved by providing access to financial services.  
However, existing evidence neither seems to justify extremely negative media 
coverage, nor gives it any reason to abandon the microfinance approach as a de-
velopment tool altogether. Even the pioneers of RCT who, besides other interven-
tions, have conducted the probably most well-known impact studies on microfi-
nance, come to conclude:  
“As economists, we were quite pleased with these results: The main objective of 
microfinance seemed to have been achieved. It was not miraculous, but it was 
working. In our minds, microcredit has earned its rightful place as one of the key 
instruments in the fight against poverty.” (Banerjee/Duflo 2011, chap. 7) 
4.3 Limits of Rigorous Impact Studies in Microfinance 
A pessimistic outlook on the future of microfinance based on existing rigorous 
evidence seems unjustified, especially as the systematic reviews clearly point out 
that there are a very limited number of studies yet which meet the required quality 
standard. This is not really astonishing, as building microfinance institutions is a 
type of intervention, which is not ideally suited to apply experimental or quasi-
experimental designs. In contrast to clearly targeted ‘treatments’, microfinance 
interventions serve the target group in a more indirect way. MFIs open a window 
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to access financial services; the clients decide by themselves whether they want to 
use that opportunity. This causes a problem of selection bias, which is difficult to 
eliminate in impact studies.  
There are other shortcomings of existing impact studies that are unlikely to be 
overcome by future research. Most importantly, almost all of them were con-
ducted during the last few years. However, the Microfinance Revolution started 
more than two decades ago. By now, MFIs have long spread out all over the de-
veloping world, most likely placing branches in the most promising locations for 
their mission. Accordingly, it will hardly be possible anymore to find a target 
group and a control group untouched by microfinance exactly in those locations, 
which had the highest impact potential in the past. Methods of rigorous impact 
analyses were simply applied too late; most probably, more impact would have 
been found if measurement had taken place when microfinance was still in its in-
fant shoes. Indirectly, this hypothesis is gaining some support by the latest sys-
tematic review (Pande 2012). It reports particularly high impacts found in studies 
on financial services which were introduced as an innovation in the respective de-
velopment context, i.e. agricultural loans or mobile banking. Beside the shortcom-
ing of measuring the impact, particularly of microcredit interventions in urban ar-
eas, too late, it seems of minor importance that the vast majority of existing stud-
ies cover timeframes of no more than 18 month, which is too short to discover po-
tential long-term impact.  
What rigorous impact studies fail to capture as well, are all potential impacts of 
microfinance interventions on the financial system as a whole. Besides its direct 
benefit for microfinance clients, financial system development is usually an addi-
tional goal associated with microfinance interventions. Undoubtedly, the microfi-
nance approach has served this purpose in several respects. Beside micro clients, 
MFIs offer their service to small and even medium enterprise, which were not 
adequately served by the banking system before. These clients, not having been 
the subject of rigorous impact analyses yet, might have a much higher potential in 
job creation than micro clients. Additionally, tens of thousands of MFI staff mem-
bers were trained, often with donor support. This most likely contributed to the 
professional standard in the financial sector, all the more as trained staff often 
moved on to other banks. Furthermore, in many developing and transition coun-
tries MFIs served as role models for good governance: they were actively pushing 
for client protection, and they were pioneers in their commitment to principles of 
responsible finance. 
5 Conclusions 
Without doubt, the reputation of microfinance suffered during its crisis. However, 
microfinance survived the crisis, and, in my view, it came out of it healthier than 
before. Support for microfinance or any other development tool that is based on 
naïve perceptions, unrealistic expectations, or a lack of knowledge of the public 
can hardly be a solid foundation for development success in the long run. Before 
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the crisis, there was a certain degree of over-promising concerning microfinance’s 
impact on the livelihoods of the poor, at least by some advocates of the microfi-
nance approach; and the remarkable growth rates of microcredit portfolios gave 
further nourishment to over-optimistic expectations. The microfinance crisis with 
its financial and its impact dimension has put this back into perspective. Microfi-
nance certainly is no magic bullet against poverty, and its positive potentials for 
improving the livelihoods of low-income people do not come without risk.  
The downside risk of credit on the borrower’s side, namely the risk of having to 
struggle to repay or even being caught in a debt-trap, can be mitigated by means of 
thorough credit analysis, transparency, and customers’ education in financial mat-
ters. However, the risk hardly ever can be eliminated because it cannot be ruled 
out that the client suffers a severe shock and repayment capacity falls well below 
former expectations. Actually, the spreading of microfinance and MFIs dimin-
ished the scope of individual MFIs for controlling credit risk of single customers 
as competition in the microfinance market usually comes along with a rising num-
ber of clients borrowing from multiple sources. This is all the more worrying as 
the success of the microfinance approach has attracted other players who just try 
to make a business, not least with consumer loans, without safeguarding against 
the dangers of over-indebtedness which are borne by the low-income customer. 
Credit bureaus are important agents that can help MFIs keeping track of clients’ 
overall credit history; that is why the establishment of such bureaus has been pro-
moted by the same donors for quite some time that are supporting microfinance. 
Despite of these improvements, it will still take a lot more in developing countries 
to round off the institutional set-up of client protection, namely by the establish-
ment of insolvency laws for private individuals allowing relief from unsustainable 
debt, and of social security systems which can guarantee an income on the subsis-
tence level. Therefore, it will remain of utmost importance that MFIs with a finan-
cial and a social mission use all their options to secure positive impacts for their 
clients as best as they can, first and foremost by providing financial services in a 
responsible way.  
Microfinance’s potential for positive impacts on clients’ livelihoods has been 
demonstrated, even if measured impacts, particularly of microcredit, stayed well 
behind of what was hoped for. Impacts of microfinance on financial sector devel-
opment, i.e. via training of staff, the promotion of transparency, good governance, 
or principles for responsible finance, have never been measured; nevertheless, 
they are existent. Last but not least, when assessing the achievements and the fu-
ture potential of microfinance, it is not to be forgotten how it all began. Without 
doubt, there is a striking success that the microfinance approach can righteously 
claim as its own: The creation of viable target-group-oriented financial institu-
tions, which after an initial phase of institution building can survive without con-
tinually being fuelled with additional subsidies. As long as access to finance goes 
along with predominantly positive impacts for its clients, these impacts will flow 
for as long as the MFI survives. Accordingly, the microfinance approach seems to 
offer a very favourable cost-benefit relation, even if impact on individual clients in 
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a single time period is small. The example of the German savings banks,3 founded 
in the beginning of the 19th century with a mission very similar to that of the MFIs 
of today, give vivid evidence of sustainable institutions serving the target group of 
micro and small enterprises as well as low- and medium-income households, by 
now for as long as about two centuries. 
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